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This paper is concerned with the question as to how much insured consumers should invest in
loss reduction measures when they can be contaminated by others due to interdependencies. To
motivate the analysis consider the following problem faced by Ms. A, an owner of an apartment in a
multi-unit building. Ms. A, who is required to purchase insurance as a condition for her mortgage,
needs to determine how much she should invest in protective measures (e.g. a sprinkler system) to
reduce the likelihood of a ﬁre occurring in her apartment knowing that there is some chance that
one of her neighbors unprotected could experience a ﬁre that could spread to her apartment and
cause damage even if she invests in these measures.
More generally, our interest is on examining the equilibrium levels of investment in protective
measures when there are interdependencies between individuals and when insurance rates are risk-
based. We show that without coordination between those at risk, individuals will, in equilibrium,
underinvest in protection relative to the socially optimal decision due to the possibility of being
contaminated by others. Restricting the amount of coverage an individual can take by requiring a
deductible on insurance policies can encourage investment in protective measures and often improves
both individual and social welfare.
To our knowledge no-one has investigated optimal behavior by insureds when they have the op-
portunity to invest in protective measures and face interdependent risks. Ehrlich and Becker (1972)
study the interaction between insurance and self-protection when there are no interdependencies.
Schlesinger and Venezian (1986) focus on the joint production of insurance and self-protection in
various market settings without interdependencies between insureds. The problem of optimal pro-
tection when there are interdependencies between agents has been recently studied by Kunreuther
and Heal (2002) and Heal and Kunreuther (2005) when there is no insurance. They developed a
game theoretic model for these interdependent security problems where there are two choices facing
an agent: don’t invest in protection at all or invest in full protection. For the case where there are
negative externalities due to the possibility of contagion from others, they show that there can be
2two Nash equilibria–either everyone invests in protection or no-one invests. The key point is that
the incentive that any agent has to invest in risk-reduction measures depends on how she expects
the others to behave in this respect. If she thinks that they will not invest in protection, then this
reduces the incentive for her to do so. On the other hand should she believe that others will invest
in risk reducing measures, then it may be best for her to also do so. So there may be an equilibrium
where no-one invests in protection, even though all would be better oﬀ if they had incurred this
cost.
The interdependency problem we are studying raises the question as to the beneﬁts of coordinat-
ing individuals’ protective decisions so that one can reduce the externalities due to contamination
and hence improve both individual and social welfare. In this sense it is related to the study by
Shavell (1991) who investigated the optimal decision by individuals to protect their property against
theft, acting alone or collectively, when precautions are observable (e.g. iron bars on a window) or
unobservable (e.g. use of a safe for storing valuables). Ayres and Levitt (1998) have demonstrated
the social beneﬁts of protection when individuals invest in unobservable precautionary measures.
They focus on the Lojack car retrieval system that criminals cannot detect. This generates positive
externalities that lead to a sub-optimal level of private investment.
The paper is organized as follows. We ﬁrst consider the case of two identical individuals where
there is no possibility of contamination from one individual to another and each individual has
an opportunity to invest in mitigation to reduce its losses with premium reductions reﬂecting the
r e d u c e dl e v e lo fr i s k .W el a b e lt h i sb a s ec a s et h eNo Contamination case. We compare this base
case with a situation where there can be contamination between the two parties and where the two
parties coordinate their actions. This case is labeled Contamination – First Best.I tw i l lb e
compared with a situation where the two parties cannot coordinate their actions and thus each party
makes a decision independent of the other. This case is labeled Contamination – Second Best.
We then turn to a situation where there is a required deductible on each insurance policy and show
that this can improve welfare if the two parties face the possibility of contamination and cannot
coordinate their actions, i.e. the case Contamination – Second Best. The concluding section
3discusses the policy implications of these ﬁndings by highlighting the importance of coordination
between agents either voluntarily or through external involvement such as building codes. We also
suggest directions for future research.
2M o d e l
There are two identical agents, i and j, who maximize expected utility with respect to an increasing,
concave utility function u(·).1 Each policyholder has initial wealth w0 and is exposed to a loss of
size L with probability p0. There is a market for self-protection and a market for insurance.
Investing in self-protection reduces the loss probability and investing in insurance transfers wealth
from the no-loss to the loss state. The cost of reducing the loss probability to pi ≤ p0 is given by
a cost function γ (∆p)=γ (p0 − pi) where γ (0) = 0, γ0 > 0,a n dγ00 > 0. The policyholder can
purchase insurance coverage I for an actuarially fair premium P = P (I). We assume that there is
no moral hazard problem, i.e. the agents’ investment in protection is veriﬁable and contractible by
the insurer.
Optimal Insurance Coverage. As insurance is actuarially fair, it is optimal for the risk-averse
agent to purchase full insurance, i.e. I∗ = L, for any level of investment in self-protection. Hence
one can investigate the decision on how much self-protection to purchase under conditions of no
contamination and contamination independently of the insurance decision. Furthermore since in-
dividuals are fully protected by insurance they do not face any risk. They will thus determine their
optimal amount of self-protection by maximizing their level of ﬁnal wealth which, in this case, is
equivalent to maximizing their expected utility of wealth. This equivalence does not hold if insur-
ance coverage is restricted and individuals therefore face risk. The optimal level of self-protection
is then derived under the maximization of expected utility of ﬁnal wealth (see Section 3).
1One obtains the same qualitative results when considering n rather than two individuals.
42.1 No Contamination
We ﬁrst review the situation in which one individual cannot be contaminated by the other. As
noted above, the optimal amount of self-protection and therefore the optimal loss probability p∗ is
determined by maximizing the value of ﬁnal wealth
max
p
W (p)=w0 − γ (p0 − p) − pL.
The ﬁrst and second derivatives with respect to p is W0 (p)=γ0 (p0 − p) − L and W00 (p)=
−γ00 (p0 − p) < 0. The objective function is thus globally concave which implies that we either
have a corner solution p∗ = p0 if γ0 (0) ≥ L or otherwise the optimal loss probability p∗ <p 0 is
determined by the ﬁrst order condition
γ0 (p0 − p∗)=L.( 1 )
The individual thus equates the marginal cost of the loss reduction, γ0 (∆p), with the marginal
beneﬁt in premium reduction, L. We now assume that γ0 (0) <L<γ 0 (p0) which implies an inner
solution 0 <p ∗ <p 0.N o t et h a ti fγ0 (p0) <Lthen p∗ =0because the marginal cost of eliminating
the probability of a loss is suﬃciently small relative to the magnitude of the loss itself that it is
worth investing so there is no exposure to this risk. Similarly if γ0 (0) >Lthen the marginal cost
of investing in any protection is so high relative to the beneﬁts in reducing the expected loss that
it is optimal not to commit any funds to mitigation.
2.2 Contamination
In this section, we introduce the possibility that one agent can be contaminated by the other agent.
Denote by q(pj) the likelihood that agent i is contaminated by the other agent, j, as a function
of the other agent’s loss probability pj. Contamination thus introduces an externality between the
two agents in the sense that the decision of one policyholder to invest in protection aﬀects the
5decision of the other policyholder. We assume that contamination is “perfect” in the sense that if
a loss is incurred by one policyholder it spreads with probability one to the other policyholder, i.e.
q(pi)=pi and q(pj)=pj.T h el o s sa n dﬁnal wealth distribution faced by policyholder i is
event prob ﬁnal wealth
loss pi +( 1− pi)pj w0 − γ (p0 − pi) − P (I) − L + I
no loss (1 − pi)(1− pj) w0 − γ (p0 − pi) − P (I)
where the actuarially fair premium is given by P (I)=( pi +( 1− pi)pj)I.
As above, given that insurance coverage is actuarially fair, it is optimal for the policyholder to
purchase full insurance, I∗ = L, independent of the amount invested in self-protection. Under full
coverage, policyholder i’s level of ﬁnal wealth is given by
Wi = W (pi,p j)=w0 − γ (p0 − pi) − (pi +( 1− pi)pj)L.
In the following two subsections, we consider the optimal investment in self-protection under the
ﬁrst-best and second-best scenarios in which policyholders can and cannot, respectively, contract
on the level of investment in protection.
First-Best. If policyholders can contract on the externalities, i.e. they jointly determine and
implement pi and pj, the Coase theorem applies and the optimal solution is given by the socially
optimal level that maximizes the aggregate level of ﬁnal wealth
Wi + Wj =2 w0 − γ (p0 − pi) − γ (p0 − pj) − 2(pi +( 1− pi)pj)L.
6The ﬁrst and second derivative of the aggregate level of wealth with respect to pi is given by
∂Wi + Wj
∂pi




= −γ00 (p0 − pi) < 0.
The aggregate level of wealth is thus globally concave which implies a unique solution p∗
i (pj) for
each pj. As the maximization problem is symmetric in i and j,l e tp∗
FB denote the optimal solution





FB).I fγ0 (0) ≥ 2(1− p0)L, then it is optimal not
to invest in protection, i.e. p∗
FB = p0.N o t e t h a t 2(1− p0)L represents the expected joint loss
to individuals i and j if neither party invests in protection. In this situation the marginal cost of
investing even a penny in protection is greater than the marginal beneﬁt of the joint reduction in
losses to individuals i and j from incurring this cost. Note that the smaller p0 is, the more likely one
invests in protection for any given value of γ0 (0) because the marginal beneﬁts to each individual
of the other investing in mitigation is (1 − p0)L which increases as p0 decreases. Otherwise, the
optimal solution is determined by the ﬁrst-order condition
γ0 (p0 − p∗
FB)=2( 1− p∗
FB)L.( 2 )
We can interpret this condition by rearranging it into
γ0 (p0 − p∗
FB)+p∗
FBL = L +( 1− p∗
FB)L.( 3 )
T h el e f th a n ds i d eo f(3) is the marginal cost of investing in protection which is the sum of the
marginal dollar cost, γ0 (p0 − p∗
FB), and the marginal increase in the premium, p∗
FBL, due to in-
directly increasing the likelihood of being contaminated by the other agent. The right hand side
of (3) is the marginal beneﬁt of investing in protection which is decomposed into the marginal
reduction in premium, L, due to the reduced likelihood of a direct loss and the marginal reduction
7in premium, (1 − p∗
FB)L, due to the reduction in the likelihood of contaminating the other agent.
The latter marginal beneﬁt represents the beneﬁt from internalizing the positive externality.
Second-Best. In this section, we examine the setting in which the two policyholders cannot con-
tract on the level of investment in self-protection and determine the pure-strategy Nash-equilibria.
Policyholder i’s best response function p∗
i (pj) is given by
p∗
i (pj) ∈ argmax
pi
Wi (pi,p j)=w0 − γ (p0 − pi) − (pi +( 1− pi)pj)L.
It therefore satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition
γ0 (p0 − p∗
i (pj)) − (1 − pj)L =0 .
Diﬀerentiating with respect to pj yields
−p∗0
i (pj)γ00 (p0 − p∗





γ00 (p0 − p∗
i (pj))
> 0.( 4 )
Policyholder i’s strategy is thus a strategic complement to policyholder j’s strategy which implies
that there are only symmetric pure-strategy Nash-equilibria.
If policyholder j reduces the loss probability to zero, i.e. pj =0 , then there is no contamination
to policyholder i and thus p∗
i (0) = p∗ which is implicitly determined by (1). Under the assumption
γ0 (0) <L<γ 0 (p0) we have an inner solution 0 <p ∗
i (0) = p∗ <p 0. If policyholder j does not
invest in self-protection, i.e. pj = p0, then policyholder i0s best response is determined by
γ0 (p0 − p∗
i (p0)) = (1 − p0)L.
8If γ0 (0) ≥ (1 − p0)L then policyholder i’s best response is also to not invest in self-protection, i.e.
p∗
i (p0)=p0.O t h e r w i s e ,i fγ0 (0) < (1 − p0)L then p∗
i (p0) <p 0.
Since 0 <p ∗
i (0) = p∗
j (0) <p 0 and since the best-response functions are increasing, they can
only cross the 45 degree line an odd number of times. We thus conclude that if γ0 (0) < (1 − p0)L






which are all inner solutions and determined by the condition
γ0 (p0 − p∗
SB)=( 1− p∗
SB)L.( 5 )
If γ0 (0) ≥ (1 − p0)L, then there also exists an odd number of pure-strategy Nash-equilibria with
the only diﬀerence that the largest equilibrium is at the corner p∗
SB = p0, i.e. there is no investment
in self-protection in this equilibrium.
In both cases, the smallest and the largest equilibrium are stable with respect to a myopic ad-
justment process and the other equilibria alternate in terms of stability and instability. The stability
condition is characterized by p∗0
i (p∗
SB) < 1 which, by equation (4) is equivalent to γ00 (p0 − p∗
SB) >L .
If the best-response functions are concave, then there exists a unique pure strategy Nash-equilibrium
which is stable with respect to a myopic adjustment process. Figure 1 shows a situation in which













To interpret condition (5),w er e a r r a n g ei ti n t o
γ0 (p0 − p∗
SB)+p∗
SBL = L.( 6 )
The left hand side of (6) is the same as under the ﬁrst-best scenario (3) , i.e. the sum of the
marginal dollar cost, γ0 (p0 − p∗
SB), and the marginal increase in the premium, p∗
SBL, due to in-
directly increasing the likelihood of being contaminated by the other agent. The right hand side
of (6), however, diﬀers from the ﬁrst-best scenario (3). The only marginal beneﬁt of investing in
protection is the marginal reduction in premium, L, due to the reduced likelihood of a direct loss.
As policyholders cannot contract on the level of investment in self-protection, it is not possible
for a policyholder to beneﬁt from the positive externality that his investment poses on the other
policyholder as shown in equation (3) for the joint solution.
102.3 Comparison
In the following subsection, we compare the level of investment in any Nash equilibrium with both
the one in the ﬁrst-best scenario and the one if policyholders do not face contamination.
Comparing Second-Best with First-Best. In this section, we compare the optimal level of
investment in self-protection in the ﬁrst-best with the one in the second-best scenario. Suppose it
is optimal to not invest in self-protection in the ﬁrst-best world, i.e. γ0 (0) ≥ 2(1− p0)L.T h e ni t
is also not optimal to invest in self-protection in the second-best world, as γ0 (0) ≥ 2(1− p0)L>
(1 − p0)L since an individual does not take into account the positive externalities provided the
others when making an investment decision. Now suppose it is optimal to invest in self-protection
in the ﬁrst-best world, i.e. γ0 (0) < 2(1− p0)L. The optimal solution is then determined by




γ0 (p0 − p∗
FB) > (1 − p∗
FB)L
and condition (5) yields p∗
SB >p ∗
FB. In any pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium the level of investment
in self-protection is thus lower compared to the ﬁrst-best scenario. The intuition behind this
result can be derived from comparing the ﬁrst-order condition (3) in the ﬁrst-best scenario under
contamination
γ0 (p0 − p)+pL = L +( 1− p)L
with the ﬁrst-order condition (5) in the second-best scenario under contamination
γ0 (p0 − p)+pL = L.
11We note that in the second-best scenario it is not possible to internalize the marginal beneﬁt
of the policyholder’s eﬀect on the other policyholder, (1 − p)L, and he therefore underinvests in
self-protection compared to the ﬁrst-best scenario.
Comparing First-Best with No-Contamination. Let us compare the optimal level of in-
vestment without contamination with the one in the ﬁrst-best scenario with contamination. The
ﬁrst-order condition (1) under no contamination is
γ0 (p0 − p)=L
and the ﬁrst-order condition (3) in the ﬁrst-best scenario under contamination is
γ0 (p0 − p)+pL = L +( 1− p)L.
By comparing the marginal costs and beneﬁts of the two scenarios, we see that contamination adds
both a marginal cost and a marginal beneﬁt of investing in self-protection. The additional marginal
cost, pL, is due to the indirect increase in the likelihood of being contaminated by the other agent
while the marginal beneﬁt, (1 − p)L, is due to the internalized positive of eﬀect on the other agent.
This implies that investment in self-protection under contamination can be larger or smaller than
under no contamination depending on whether the additional marginal beneﬁt is larger or smaller
than the additional marginal cost.
Under the condition p0 < 1/2–which seems most relevant for insurance events–the additional
marginal beneﬁt is larger than the additional marginal cost of investing in self-protection. It is thus
optimal to invest more in self-protection under the ﬁrst-best scenario with contamination compared
to the scenario in which agents cannot be contaminated which yields p∗
FB <p ∗.
To be more precise, suppose it is optimal to not invest in self-protection if there is no contamina-
tion, i.e. γ0 (0) ≥ L. Then it may still be optimal to invest in self-protection in the ﬁrst-best world
with contamination since the condition for not investing is γ0 (0) ≥ 2(1− p0)L and 2(1− p0)L>L
12for all p0 < 1/2. Now suppose that it is optimal to invest in self-protection without contamination.
Then policyholders invest more in self-protection in the ﬁrst-best world with contamination as the
ﬁrst-order condition γ0 (p0 − p∗)=L under no contamination implies
γ0 (p0 − p∗) < 2(1− p∗)L
for all p0 < 1/2 and condition (3) yields p∗
FB <p ∗.
Comparing Second-Best with No-Contamination. Let us now compare the optimal level
of investment without contamination with the one in the second-best scenario with contamination.
Suppose it is optimal to not invest in self-protection if there is no contamination, i.e. γ0 (0) ≥ L.
Then it is also optimal to not invest in self-protection in the second-best world as γ0 (0) ≥ L
implies γ0 (0) > (1 − p0)L. Now suppose that it is optimal to invest in self-protection without
contamination. Then policyholders invest less in self-protection in the second-best world with
contamination as the ﬁrst-order condition γ0 (p0 − p∗)=L implies
γ0 (p0 − p∗) > (1 − p∗)L
and condition (5) yields p∗
SB >p ∗. In any pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium the level of investment
in self-protection is thus lower compared to the scenario in which policyholders do not face possible
contamination. The intuition behind this result can again be derived by comparing the ﬁrst-order
conditions (6) in the second-best scenario under contamination
γ0 (p0 − p)+pL = L
with the ﬁrst-order condition (1) under no contamination is
γ0 (p0 − p)=L.
13In the second-best scenario policyholders, by investing in self-protection, face the additional marginal
cost of implicitly increasing the likelihood of being contaminated by the other policyholder, pL.
The marginal cost equates the marginal beneﬁt of investing in self-protection thus at a lower level
of investment.
2.4 Illustrative Example
Suppose that the cost of reducing the probability from p0 to pi is given by the function





As γ0 (0) = 0, it is optimal under all three scenarios to invest in self-protection. We also assume
γ0 (p0)=cp0 >Lsuch that the optimal loss probability is strictly positive. Solving the ﬁrst-order
conditions (1), (2),a n d(5) yields the following solutions:














We observe that p∗
SB >p ∗ and p∗
SB >p ∗
FB. Furthermore, the best response function of individual






Since it is linear in pj the solution p∗
SB above is the unique pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium.
143 Improving Welfare by Restricting Insurance Coverage
In the section above, we have shown that individuals ineﬃciently underinvest in self-protection if
they cannot coordinate their activities. In this section, we show that restricting insurance coverage,
e.g. by requiring a deductible in the insurance policy, can improve individual and social welfare
in a second best world with contamination. With a deductible, each individual has to bear part
of their own loss and is likely to have more of an incentive to invest in self-protection than if he
had full insurance coverage. The additional investment in self-protection creates an extra marginal
beneﬁt, (1 − p)L, through the positive externality that exists between individuals. In the following
Proposition, we specify conditions under which this beneﬁt outweighs the cost of bearing part of the
loss and implies that partial insurance is optimal. It is important, however, that the deductible is
enforced by some regulatory entity. In an unregulated environment, an insurer always will deviate
by oﬀering full coverage to attract all customers.2
Proposition 1 Suppose that the stability condition γ00 (p0 − p∗
SB) >Lholds where p∗
SB is the loss
probability in a Nash-equilibrium under full insurance coverage, implicitly deﬁned by (5). Then the









γ00 (p0 − p∗
SB). (7)
Proof. See Appendix.
Imposing a strictly positive deductible and thereby forcing agents to invest more in self-protection
can only be welfare-improving if the marginal beneﬁt of internalizing the externality, i.e. (1 − p)L,
is relatively large. This is exactly reﬂected in the necessary and suﬃcient condition (7).I fp∗
SB is
relatively small, the marginal beneﬁt of internalizing the externality, (1 − p∗
SB)L, is relatively large
and (7) is satisﬁed.
2Since individuals face risk under restricted insurance coverage, the proof requires the maximization of expected
utility of ﬁnal wealth.
15This result should be contrasted with the case of terrorism insurance considered by Lakdawalla
and Zanjani (2005) where protection by one target leads the terrorist to attack a less protected
target. Protection thus creates a negative externality and an ineﬃcient overinvestment in self-
protection. A governmental subsidy of terrorism insurance can improve social welfare by discourag-
ing investment in protection. In our case, there is a positive externality associated with investment
in protection. Social welfare is now improved by limiting insurance through a deductible, thereby
encouraging investment in protection.
Remark 2 In the proof of Proposition 1, we show that small, but strictly positive deductibles induce
agents to invest more in self-protection if and only if p∗
SB < 1 −
p
1/2. Note that this condition
is implied by the necessary and suﬃcient condition (7), i.e. enforcing a strictly positive deductible
can only be optimal if it induces agents to invest more in self-protection than they would under full
insurance coverage.
Put diﬀerently, if the probability of a loss under full insurance coverage is relatively large,
i.e. p∗
SB > 1 −
p
1/2, limiting insurance by enforcing a deductible discourages the investment in
protection. This is related to the ﬁnding of Ehrlich and Becker (1972) who show that the absence
of market insurance can discourage the investment in self-protection if the probability of a loss is
relatively large.
3.1 Illustrative Example
We continue our previous illustrative example in Section 2.4 with γ00 (p0 − pi)=c.T h e n
p∗
SB = p0 −
(1 − p0)L
c − L
16with cp0 >Lwhich implies γ00 (p0 − pi)=c>L . The necessary and suﬃcient condition (7) for the
optimal enforced deductible to be strictly positive is






4 Implications for Policy
The bundling of protection and insurance has a long history dating back to the factory mutuals
founded in the early 19th century in New England (Bainbridge, 1952). These mutual companies
oﬀered factories an opportunity to pay a small premium in exchange for protection against poten-
tially large losses from ﬁr ew h i l ea tt h es a m et i m er e q u i r i n gi n s pections of the factory both prior
to issuing a policy and after one was in force. Poor risks had their policies canceled; premium re-
ductions were given to factories that instituted loss prevention measures. For example, the Boston
Manufacturers worked with lantern manufacturers to encourage them to develop safer designs and
then advised all policyholders that they had to purchase lanterns from those companies whose
products met their speciﬁcations. In many cases, insurance would only be provided to companies
that adopted speciﬁc loss prevention methods. For example one company, the Spinners Mutual,
only insured risks where automatic sprinkler systems were installed. The Manufacturers Mutual
in Providence, Rhode Island developed speciﬁcations for ﬁre hoses and advised mills to buy only
from companies that met these standards.
Private insurers today should consider requiring protective measures as a condition for insurance
with respect to standard homeowners coverage to reduce the negative externalities due to contagion.
However, all insurers would have to ﬁnd it in their ﬁnancial interest to follow this strategy because of
the contractual arrangements with respect to claims payments. Any insurer who provides protection
to individual i is responsible for losses incurred by this policyholder no matter who caused the
damage.3 One reason for this arrangement between insurer and insured is the diﬃculty in assigning
3With respect to ﬁre damage, a classic case is H.R. Moch Co., Inc. v Rensselaer Water Co. 247N.Y.160, 159 N.E.
896 which ruled that “A wrongdoer who by negligence sets ﬁre to a building is liable in damages to the owner where
17causality for a particular event. Without protection requirements by other insurers, a competitive
insurer will have to charge premiums that reﬂect the actions of policyholders who are independently
deciding how much to invest in protection given that they have some chance of being contaminated
by others.
One way of coordinating protective decisions of individuals is through a monopolistic insurer
who can require the adoption of such measures or provide premium incentives for those at risk to
adopt them to internalize the externalities due to interdependencies . A competitive insurer may
not be able to do this as easily if others in the industry do not take similar actions. von Ungern-
Sternberg (1996) provides an empirical study of the pricing and performance of insurance markets in
Switzerland and compares the performance of competitive insurers in seven cantons of the country
with local state monopolies in the 19 other cantons. The study ﬁnds that for very similar products
the monopolies charge premiums that are 70 percent lower than for the competitive insurance, they
spend substantially more on ﬁre prevention and have much lower damage rates.
Some type of coordinative mechanism may also improve both individual and social welfare with-
out having to rely on the power of the monopolist insurer. One option is for a well-enforced standard
or regulation, such as a building code, that requires individuals and ﬁrms to adopt cost-eﬀective
protective mechanisms when they would not do so voluntarily. One could also turn to the private
sector to coordinate decisions through an industry association that stipulates that any member has
to follow certain rules and regulations. For example, an apartment owners association could require
that all residents in the building adopt certain ﬁre protective measures such as installing a smoke
alarm and/or a sprinkler system. The association could then arrange to purchase insurance for all
units in the building where the premiums would reﬂect the required protection that would reduce
the chances of a ﬁre occurring.
the ﬁre has its origin, but not to other owners who are injured when it spreads”. We are indebted to Victor Goldberg
w h op r o v i d e du sw i t ht h i sc a s e .
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196 A p p e n d i x :P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
The economic environment is as above in the second-best scenario in which individuals cannot contract on
their investment in self-protection. The only diﬀerence is that the insurance policy includes a deductible D,
i.e., the insurer pays L−D in case of a loss. The loss and ﬁnal wealth distribution faced by policyholder i is
event prob ﬁnal wealth
loss pi +( 1− pi)pj w0 − γ (p0 − pi) − P (D) − D
no loss (1 − pi)(1− pj) w0 − γ (p0 − pi) − P (D)
where the actuarially fair premium is given by P (D)=( pi +( 1− pi)pj)(L − D). Policyholder 1’s expected
utility of ﬁnal wealth is given by
EUi (pi,p j,D)=( 1 − pi)(1− pj)u(w0 − γ (p0 − pi) − P (D))
+(pi +( 1− pi)pj)u(w0 − γ (p0 − pi) − P (D) − D).
Policyholder i’s best response function p∗
i (pj,D) is given by
p∗










which satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order condition
(1 − p∗
SB (D))(u(w0 − γ (p0 − p∗
SB (D)) − P (D) − D) − u(w0 − γ (p0 − p∗
SB (D)) − P (D)))
+(1− p∗
SB (D))
2 (γ0 (p0 − p∗
SB (D)) − (1 − p∗
SB (D))(L − D))u0 (w0 − γ (p0 − p∗
SB (D)) − P (D))
+p∗
SB (D)(2− p∗
SB (D))(γ0 (p0 − p∗
SB (D)) − (1 − p∗
SB (D))(L − D))u0 (w0 − γ (p0 − p∗
SB (D)) − P (D) − D)
=0 . (8)
At D =0we get the condition
γ0 (p0 − p∗
SB (0)) − (1 − p∗
SB (0))L =0 ,( 9 )
where p∗
SB (0) = p∗
SB. For a given deductible D, the level of expected utility is thus given by
EUi (p∗
SB (D),p ∗
SB (D),D)=( 1 − p∗
SB (D))
2 u(w0 − γ (p0 − p∗
SB (D)) − P (D))
+(2− p∗
SB (D))p∗
SB (D)u(w0 − γ (p0 − p∗
SB (D)) − P (D) − D). (10)






SB (0)(1 − p∗
SB (0))Lu0 (w0 − γ (p0 − p∗
SB (0)) − P (0)). (11)
To determine the sign of the ﬁrst derivative we implicitly diﬀerentiate the ﬁrst-order condition (8) with
respect to D and evaluate it at D =0 .W ed e r i v e
p∗0
SB (0)(L − γ00 (p0 − p∗
SB (0))) = 0.
The stability condition γ00 (p0 − p∗
SB (0)) >Lthen implies p∗0












SB (0)(1 − p∗
SB (0))Lu0 (w0 − γ (p0 − p∗




SB (0)(2 − p∗
SB (0))u00 (w0 − γ (p0 − p∗
SB (0)) − P (0)). (12)
Implicitly diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order condition (8) twice with respect to D and evaluating at D =0yields
p∗00
SB (0)(L − γ00 (p0 − p∗
SB (0)))u0 (w0 − γ (p0 − p∗
SB (0)) − P (0))
=( 1 − p∗
SB (0))
³




u00 (w0 − γ (p0 − p∗











u00 (w0 − γ (p0 − p∗
SB (0)) − P (0))
(L − γ00 (p0 − p∗
SB (0)))u0 (w0 − γ (p0 − p∗
SB (0)) − P (0))
. (13)
If p∗
SB (0) < 1 −
p
1/2 then p∗00
SB (0) < 0 and small deductible levels thus increase the investment in self-
protection. Note that this condition is implied by the necessary and suﬃcient condition (7). Substitution of





















2 u00 (w0 − γ (p0 − p∗
SB (0)) − P (0)).
(14)














γ00 (p0 − p∗
SB (0)).
21